Files
beszel-ipv6/internal/hub/trusted_proxy_test.go
José M. Requena Plens 4bf70700f2 feat(hub): add TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS allowlist for TRUSTED_AUTH_HEADER (#2327)
With TRUSTED_AUTH_HEADER set, the hub authenticates a request from the
header alone, whichever address it comes from. That is right when every
request passes through the reverse proxy, and not when the hub can also
be reached directly: anyone who can reach it sets the header themselves.

TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS takes a comma-separated list of IPs or CIDR ranges.
When set, the header is only honored on requests whose peer address is
in the list; other requests fall through to the normal authentication.
When unset, nothing changes.

The check uses the connection's RemoteAddr, not a forwarded header, so
the list names the proxy itself. IPv4-mapped IPv6 entries are treated as
IPv4. Entries that do not parse are skipped with a warning on the
console; a list with no valid entry trusts nobody, so a typo narrows the
allowlist instead of widening it.
2026-09-17 13:48:46 -04:00

128 lines
3.2 KiB
Go

//go:build testing
package hub
import (
"net/netip"
"os"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestParseTrustedProxies(t *testing.T) {
testCases := []struct {
name string
value string
prefixes []string
restricted bool
}{
{
name: "empty",
value: "",
restricted: false,
},
{
name: "blank",
value: " , ",
prefixes: nil,
restricted: true,
},
{
name: "single addresses become host prefixes",
value: "10.0.0.5, 2001:db8::1",
prefixes: []string{"10.0.0.5/32", "2001:db8::1/128"},
restricted: true,
},
{
name: "cidrs are masked",
value: "172.16.5.9/12,fd00::1/64",
prefixes: []string{"172.16.0.0/12", "fd00::/64"},
restricted: true,
},
{
name: "ipv4-mapped entries become ipv4",
value: "::ffff:10.0.0.5, ::ffff:10.0.0.0/104",
prefixes: []string{"10.0.0.5/32", "10.0.0.0/8"},
restricted: true,
},
{
name: "invalid entries are skipped, valid ones kept",
value: "proxy.internal, 10.0.0.0/8, 300.1.1.1, ::ffff:0.0.0.0/64",
prefixes: []string{"10.0.0.0/8"},
restricted: true,
},
{
name: "only invalid entries trust nobody",
value: "proxy.internal",
prefixes: nil,
restricted: true,
},
}
for _, tc := range testCases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS", tc.value)
prefixes, restricted := parseTrustedProxies()
assert.Equal(t, tc.restricted, restricted)
var got []string
for _, p := range prefixes {
got = append(got, p.String())
}
assert.Equal(t, tc.prefixes, got)
})
}
t.Run("unset", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS", "")
os.Unsetenv("TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS")
prefixes, restricted := parseTrustedProxies()
assert.False(t, restricted)
assert.Nil(t, prefixes)
})
t.Run("prefixed env var takes precedence", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS", "10.0.0.0/8")
t.Setenv("BESZEL_HUB_TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS", "192.168.0.0/16")
prefixes, restricted := parseTrustedProxies()
assert.True(t, restricted)
require.Len(t, prefixes, 1)
assert.Equal(t, "192.168.0.0/16", prefixes[0].String())
})
}
func TestIsTrustedProxy(t *testing.T) {
prefixes := []netip.Prefix{
netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("2001:db8::/32"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("fe80::/10"),
}
testCases := []struct {
name string
remoteAddr string
trusted bool
}{
{"ipv4 in prefix", "10.20.30.40:51234", true},
{"ipv4 outside prefix", "11.0.0.1:51234", false},
{"ipv6 in prefix", "[2001:db8:1::2]:443", true},
{"ipv6 outside prefix", "[2001:db9::1]:443", false},
{"ipv4-mapped ipv6 matches ipv4 prefix", "[::ffff:10.1.2.3]:80", true},
{"zone is ignored", "[fe80::1%eth0]:80", true},
{"no port", "10.1.2.3", true},
{"empty", "", false},
{"garbage", "not-an-address:80", false},
}
for _, tc := range testCases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, tc.trusted, isTrustedProxy(prefixes, tc.remoteAddr))
})
}
t.Run("empty allowlist trusts nobody", func(t *testing.T) {
assert.False(t, isTrustedProxy(nil, "10.0.0.1:1"))
})
}